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DISCOURSE NORMS AS DEFAULT
RULES: STRUCTURING CORPORATE
SPEECH TO MULTIPLE
STAKEHOLDERS
David G. Yosifon †
ABSTRACT
This Article analyzes corporate speech problems through the
framework of corporate law. The focus here is on the “discourse
norms” that regulate corporate speech to various corporate stakeholders, including shareholders, workers, and consumers. I argue that
these “discourse norms” should be understood as default terms in the
“nexus-of-contracts” that comprises the corporation. Having reviewed
the failure of corporate law as it bears on the interests of nonshareholding stakeholders such as workers and consumers, I urge the
adoption of prescriptive discourse norms as an approach to reforming
corporate governance in a socially useful manner.
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“Truth is mighty and will prevail. There is nothing the matter
with this, except that it ain’t so.” 1
-- Mark Twain
“I have heard it broached that orders should be given in
great new ships by electric telegraph. I admire machinery as
much as any man, and am as thankful to it as any man can be
for what it does for us. But it will never be a substitute for the
face of a man, with his soul in it, encouraging another man to
be brave and true. Never try it for that. It will break down like
a straw.” 2

-- Charles Dickens
“It is only the Board that this in the end can come
from.” 3
-- Michael Jensen

1

MARK TWAIN, MARK TWAIN’S NOTEBOOK 345 (Harper & Brothers 1935).
Charles Dickens, The Wreck of the Golden Mary, HOUSEHOLD WORDS,
Dec. 25, 1856 at 10 (1856).
3
Michael C. Jensen, Professor of Bus. Admin., Harvard Bus. Sch., Presentation at the Stanford Law School: Beyond Agency Theory: The Hidden and Heretofore
Inaccessible
Power
of
Integrity
(Feb.
11,
2010),
http://rockcenter.stanford.edu/2010/02/11/beyond-agency-theory-the-hidden-andheretofore-inaccessible-power-of-integrity/.
2

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1905783

2011]

CORPORATE SPEECH TO MULTIPLE STAKEHOLDERS

191

INTRODUCTION
The destructive influence of corporate speech can be seen in many
public policy problems. Examples abound, but are highly salient in the
area of public health. The tobacco epidemic of the twentieth century,
the obesity epidemic’s ravages so far this century, massive environmental degradation—these problems and more have been catalyzed by
the combination of corporate political speech in the regulatory arena,
and corporate commercial speech in the marketplace. 4 Solutions to the
problem of corporate speech have long been wanting. Recently, the
United States Supreme Court held in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission that corporate political speech cannot be muzzled by
government regulation. 5 Since the 1970s the Supreme Court has also
given substantial constitutional protection to commercial speech, and
there is little reason to expect a reversal of this orientation on the
Court. 6
Of course, in addition to its destructive power, corporate speech
has also contributed to human flourishing. For example, commercial
speech was instrumental in circulating information about the availability and use of birth control, which many scholars argue has been an
important part of the struggle for freedom and equality in our society.7
Nevertheless, there is widespread concern that corporate speech routinely impedes the development of sound public policy. Here I pursue
the theoretical case that we do indeed have a corporate speech problem, 8 and I explore a possible solution to the problem which does not
4

See David Yosifon, The Consumer Interest in Corporate Law, 43 U.C.
DAVIS. L. REV. 253, 270-81 (2009) [hereinafter The Consumer Interest in Corporate
Law] (reviewing case studies of social problems relating to corporate activity in consumer markets, including tobacco, junk food, and dietary supplements); see also
David M. Uhlmann, After the Spill is Gone: The Gulf of Mexico, Environmental
Crime and the Criminal Law, MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (reviewing lapse of
environmental safeguards that contributed to the severity of the 2010 Deepwater
Horizon
oil
disaster
in
the
Gulf
of
Mexico),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1740567.
5
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
6
See, e.g., Arlen W. Langvardt, The Incremental Strengthening of First
Amendment Protection for Commercial Speech: Lessons from Greater New Orleans
Broadcasting, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 587 (2000) (arguing that the Court has trended towards ever greater protection for commercial speech and that an intensification of that
trend should be expected).
7
See, e.g., Owen Fiss, What is Feminism?, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 413, 422
(1994); Lorraine Schmall, Birth Control as a Labor Law Issue, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L.
& POL’Y 139, 142-152 (2006).
8
See David Yosifon, The Public Choice Problem in Corporate Law: Corporate Social Responsibility After Citizens United, 89 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming
2011) [hereinafter The Public Choice Problem in Corporate Law] (on file with au-
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require the kind of corporate censorship that the Supreme Court has
disallowed on First Amendment grounds.
Specifically, I argue that corporate speech can be usefully reformed by altering corporate law. I argue for the institutionalization of
firm governance dynamics which will change the way that corporations speak to and about their shareholders, workers, consumers, the
community at large, and government. This approach seeks to solve the
corporate speech problem by generating more socially useful corporate speech, rather than constraining or silencing it through external
governmental regulation.

I. THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE SPEECH
A. The Source of Corporate Power
While many organisms communicate, the human ability to deploy
elaborate expressive and representational systems in a community of
similarly capable individuals is among the defining attributes of our
species. 9 In the longue duree of human history speech has played a
crucial part in our ability to achieve the coordination necessary to
build and maintain civilization. This is not to say that speech explains
it all—sheer force, inexpressible love, the tides, the winds, the will, all
of these are also essential components of the human condition. But
speech is an important category in any conception of the important
elements of human life. In contemporary society, the corporation is
among the most significant institutions that organizes, produces, circulates and listens to speech acts.
Corporations are powerful institutions because they can efficiently
coordinate the activity of many individuals and groups, including
holders of capital, workers, and consumers. 10 This capacity for coordination is generated by the corporation’s centralized, authoritative
decision-making structure. 11 The corporation’s board of directors
makes all decisions about how the resources brought by each group
will be deployed. Various stakeholders all accede to the boards’ decithor) (arguing that the public choice problems caused by corporate political speech
undermines the social utility of the shareholder primacy norm in corporate governance).
9
See P. Lieberman, On Human Speech, Syntax, and Language, 3 HUMAN
EVOLUTION 3 (1988) (providing overview of importance of speech to the development
of human societies).
10
See Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937)
(arguing that firms develop when the costs of organizing production by fiat are less
than the costs of discovering prices and coordinating transactions in spot markets).
11
See generally STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2008) (explicating director primacy theory).
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sions, or else they do no business with the firm. The coordinating
power of the board is a beautiful thing. The consumer who wakes in
the morning desiring an internet-ready cell phone need not drive down
the street looking for electronic engineers, designers, and programmers with whom she might set up a meeting to talk about producing
the item in exchange for her cash. The coal miner need not say each
morning to some holder of capital that she is skilled in the hefting of
the pick and knows a good place for digging, the two then writing a
contract over breakfast regarding what land should be purchased for
digging on that afternoon. Instead labor and capital both submit their
particular assets to the centralized decision-making structure of the
firm, which deploys the labor and capital in the most beneficial way,
returning wages and profits to labor and capital far greater than either
could have generated on their own. The consumer is offered a predesigned, internet-ready phone on a take-it-or-leave-it basis at a specified price, undoubtedly cheaper than she could have come up with on
her own. 12
The authoritative decision-making advantage of the firm, brilliant
as it is, also constitutes one of the corporation’s greatest design flaws.
Having turned over control of their assets to the board of directors, the
firm’s stakeholders are beset with the problem of holding the board of
directors accountable. This is the agency problem: how do you ensure
that corporate directors (agents) operate faithfully on behalf of their
stakeholders, rather than in directors’ own interests through general
malingering or outright stealing of corporate assets? 13
The prevailing view is that different stakeholders should get different solutions to the agency problem. Shareholders require the exclusive fiduciary attention of directors inside the corporate boardroom
because of their (the shareholders) distance from firm operations.
Workers, in comparison, are physically present on the shop floor and
can therefore monitor and negotiate the terms of their labor themselves, individually or collectively. Consumers are present at the
cash-register and can monitor their interest in corporate activity by
inspecting the goods, services, and prices offered. In sum, the agency
problem is managed for shareholders by imposing fiduciary obligations to shareholders on the board of directors, while the agency problem for workers and consumers is managed primarily by particula12

Thus, it should be seen that the corporation is a nexus-of-contracts—a set
of relationships—it is not an “entity,” and it is not a single of piece of property that is
“owned” by shareholders. See id. at 32-35.
13
See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATE AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) (providing the seminal statement of the
agency problem in corporate law).
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rized terms in specific contracts on a negotiated or take-it-or-leave-it
basis. Where workers and consumers are vulnerable and cannot protect their interests through contract, corporate theory calls for such
vulnerabilities to be solved through external governmental regulation
such as labor laws and consumer protection statutes, rather than
through any departure from shareholder primacy in firm governance. 14
Corporate law theorists contend that this organizational design is
in the best interest of capital, labor, and consumers. It is therefore the
regime that these stakeholders would voluntarily agree to if they sat
down and negotiated the matter (or at least it is the regime they would
all agree to after hearing a lecture on shareholder primacy theory).15
But these groups do not actually negotiate and plan the design themselves. To do so would be as transactionally-burdensome as driving
down the street looking for a designer to build an internet phone. Instead, the basic organizational design is incorporated by law into
corporate charters as an “off-the-rack” ready-made system. Users of
corporate charters are free to delete default corporate governance provisions and replace them with some other schema, perhaps one in
14
Space considerations prelude me from providing a comprehensive rehearsal of shareholder primacy theory. Nevertheless, the basic version recounted here
should suffice as an introduction to the problem of corporate speech, which is the
subject of this Article. The agency problem for shareholders is actually solved
through three basic mechanisms: the law of fiduciary obligation, administrative regulation of securities trading, and the invisible, disciplining hand of the market. Many
would argue that the market is the most crucial mechanism that solves the shareholders’ agency problem. If a firm’s stock price is low investors will sell or be loath to
purchase new issues, thus threatening the job or status security of incumbent directors
and officers. The shares of underperforming firms will be undervalued in the securities markets, creating opportunities for raiders (or “liberators,” depending on your
perspective) to purchase a controlling interest in the firm, install new management,
and reap the rewards of superior performance. The threat of such raiding (or liberating) keeps incumbent directors working hard, which solves the agency problem for
shareholders. Nevertheless, because corporate law allows directors to establish structural defenses against hostile takeovers, even to the extent that such efforts forestall
the disciplining power of the market for control, the fiduciary obligation of directors
to shareholders remains a pivotal element of shareholder protections. See
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 11, at 105-53. For a fuller version, and more general critique,
of shareholder primacy theory, see The Consumer Interest in Corporate Law, supra
note 4, at 255-83 and The Public Choice Problem in Corporate Law, supra note 8.
15
In his recent monograph on director primacy, Stephen Bainbridge invites
us to imagine corporate law coming out of a meeting between the parties to the corporate contract around a hypothetical “conference table.” BAINBRIDGE, supra note 11, at
31. But urging us to think of corporate law as coming out of a conference room invites us to forget one of the most important elements of the nexus of contracts conception, and that is that these are not negotiated terms. The “poetic” nature of the
“conference table” abstraction should be highlighted rather than obscured when we
talk about corporate law in theory and practice.
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which important corporate decisions are submitted directly to a vote
by all stakeholders. In practice this does not happen. Corporate stakeholders stick with the default rules of directorial authority and shareholder primacy for one of two reasons. First, maybe it really is the
rule that stakeholders would settle on if they designed the corporate
governance structure themselves, so there is no impetus to change it.
Second, stakeholders may stick with the default rule because they find
it prohibitively costly, in terms of time, intelligence, and logistics, to
negotiate an alternative arrangement. Thus, they stick with the default
because they are stuck with it. 16
For reasons I explore below, corporate law’s purported solutions
to the agency problem leave non-shareholding stakeholders vulnerable
to manipulation and exploitation by corporations acting on behalf of
shareholders. Here I will focus in particular on non-shareholder’s susceptibility to the adverse influence of corporate speech. To track this
influence, I explore the distinct discourse norms that attend corporate
speech to different corporate stakeholders, including shareholders,
workers, and consumers. I contend that these discourse norms should
themselves be regarded as default rules of corporate law, and I argue
that the discourse norm defaults should be altered in order to improve
corporate operation for non-shareholding stakeholders. My focus on
discourse norms provides a heretofore unexcavated foothold in the
quest for a post-shareholder-primacy model of corporate governance.
B. Discourse Norms and Corporate Law
1. Discourse Norms and Speech Generally
By “discourse norms,” I am referring to the practical and moral
expectations that give semantic value to speech acts. I also mean the
phrase “discourse norms” to refer to people’s conscious or subconscious expectations about how they should be talking in particular circumstances. 17 Discourse norms, like norms generally, are associated

16

Social psychologists refer to the sticky default phenomena as the “endowment effect.” See Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1, 41-42 (2004) [hereinafter The Situational Character] (reviewing endowment effect); see also KENT
GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND
PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 16-18 (2006) (recognizing the stickiness of defaults in
corporate law).
17
Donald Langevoort describes part of what I have in mind when I refer to
“discourse norms,” when he speaks of the “regulati[on ] [of] human and organization
discourse: who determines what meaning can properly be drawn from what someone
says or does not say, and with what sort of guidance for making hard judgments about
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with behavioral expectations that can be regulated both legally and
extra-legally, both formally and informally. 18
Discourse norms can be identified and distinguished by examining the significance of speech acts in different contexts. Consider for
example a hypothetical circumstance in which President Bill Clinton,
in the private family quarters of the White House, tells his wife Hillary that there “is no sexual relationship” with a particular intern in the
Office of the President. 19 Suppose it was the case that Bill had in fact
engaged in extensive sexual activity with the intern over a period of
many months, but that there had been no such encounter for several
months before he said “there is no sexual relationship” to his wife.
Norms refer to shared expectations about what the use of particular
words, phrases, and sentences in particular contexts mean. Under the
discourse norms of family discussion, Bill’s statement pretty clearly
counts as a lie. It at least counts as “misleading” in a way that invites
condemnation and reform, if Bill and his wife are to remain in the
relationship of marriage. The discourse norms of romance, family, and
what was meant.” Donald C. Langevoort, Half-Truths: Protecting Mistaken Inferences by Investors and Others, 52 STAN. L. REV. 87, 124 (1999).
18
See generally ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991) (analyzing the power of norms in the extra-legal
regulation of conduct); see also Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient
Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697 (1995) (critiquing norm-based regulation).
19
This example is drawn from Stephen Gillers’ discussion of the lawyer’s
ethical obligation of candor to the tribunal in his excellent casebook. STEPHEN
GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 401-06 (8th ed.,
2009). Neither Gillers nor I intend to be characterizing Clinton’s actual statements to
his wife in that most personal of conversations. Indeed, the statement “there is no
sexual relationship” was really made not by Clinton, but in an affidavit by former
Office of the President intern Monica Lewinsky, and later by Clinton’s lawyer, William Bennett, when characterizing Lewinsky’s affidavit. When Clinton said that “it
depends on what the meaning of the word ‘is’ is” he was responding to a question
asking whether Bennett was lying when he said it. Id. at 404. Arguably, Clinton was
trying to protect his lawyer as much as himself. In her memoir Hillary Clinton states
that when reports of Bill’s affair broke in January of 1998, “I questioned Bill over and
over . . . . [h]e continued to deny any improper behavior. . . .” HILLARY RODHAM
CLINTON, LIVING HISTORY 441 (2003). Later that year, she writes,
[h]e told me for the first time that the situation was much more serious than
he had previously acknowledged. He now realized that he would testify that
there had been inappropriate intimacy. He told me that what had happened
between them had been brief and sporadic. He couldn’t tell me seven
months ago, he said, because he was too ashamed to admit it and he knew
how angry and hurt I would be.
Id. at 466. In his memoir, Clinton writes that when he acknowledged the affair to
his wife, “I still didn’t understand why I had done something so wrong and stupid; that understanding would come slowly, in the months of working on our
relationship that lay ahead.” BILL CLINTON, MY LIFE 800 (2004).
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friendship generally occasion an expectation of co-operation with
respect to the meaning of what is said. There is an assumption that the
speech of the lover, the parent, the child, the friend, will be useful to
the relationship of the interlocutors, and not solely to the individual
speaking. These assumptions are a part of and lend meaning to the
speech acts within such relationships.
If, however, Bill spoke the words “there is no sexual relationship”
in a different context, governed by different discourse norms, his
words might have a very different import. For example, if he spoke
them under cross-examination before a grand jury or a specialprosecutor’s investigation, and if when he spoke them there had been
no sexual encounter with the intern for several months, then the
statement would probably not count as a lie. It would probably not
even be considered “misleading” in a sense which would trigger condemnation or response. The accused’s relationship to the prosecutor is
adversarial, and the discourse norms in such a relationship presume a
less forthcoming, more self-interested mode of expression. 20 The
point is that especially with respect to hard questions about the meaning and significance of speech, the discourse norms are often decisive.
2. Discourse Norms and Corporate Law
a. Different Speech for Different Stakeholders
Under prevailing law, different discourse norms attend corporate
speech depending on the category of corporate stakeholder addressed.
i. Shareholders
The principal way that corporate law enforces the fiduciary duties
that directors owe to shareholders is through the imposition of discourse norms. In order to satisfy their duty of care, directors must
speak with each other about what kind of corporate conduct is in the
shareholders’ best interest. Indeed, the requirement to speak and deliberate in an informed and good faith fashion more or less describes
both the necessary and the sufficient condition for satisfying directors’ obligations to shareholders. Directors are completely insulated
from liability to shareholders for bad, non-self-interested business
decisions so long as they comply with the requirement of forthcoming, honest, good faith deliberation in the shareholder interest. In or20

Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 358-59 (1973) (“If a witness
evades, it is the lawyer’s responsibility to recognize the evasion and to bring the witness back to the mark, to flush out the whole truth with the tools of adversary examination.”).
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der to satisfy that fiduciary duty of good faith, the director’s speech
acts must also be sincere—she must honestly believe the things she
says are in the shareholder’s best interest are in fact in their best interest. 21
ii. Non-shareholders
Workers and consumers, like shareholders, are part of the nexusof-contracts over which the corporate board of directors presides.
Instead of fiduciary-based attention at the level of firm governance,
however, consumers must monitor their interests in corporate operations by themselves, in the market.
Unlike shareholders, consumers are not as a matter of corporate
law entitled to any internal corporate speech or deliberations about
their interests. Corporations, however, are entitled under the First

21

See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967-68 (Del.
Ch. 1996) (quoted in In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 964
A.2d. 106, 122 (Del. Ch. 2009)). The court states:
What should be understood, but may not widely be understood by courts or
commentators who are not often required to face such questions, is that
compliance with a director’s duty of care can never appropriately be judicially determined by reference to the content of the board decision that
leads to a corporate loss, apart from consideration of the good faith or rationality of the process employed. That is, whether a judge or jury considering
the matter after the fact, believes a decision substantively wrong, or degrees
of wrong extending through “stupid” to “egregious” or “irrational”, provides no ground for director liability, so long as the court determines that
the process employed was either rational or employed in a good faith effort
to advance corporate interests. To employ a different rule—one that permitted an “objective” evaluation of the decision—would expose directors to
substantive second guessing by ill-equipped judges or juries, which would,
in the long-run, be injurious to investor interests. Thus, the business judgment rule is process oriented and informed by a deep respect for all good
faith board decisions.
Id.; see also Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Min. Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987)
(“[T]he duty of care requires a director, when making a business decision, to proceed
with a ‘critical eye’ by acting in an informed and deliberate manner respecting the
corporate merits of an issue before the board.” (citing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488
A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
Fiduciary standards also govern corporate speech to their shareholders, whether such
speech is voluntary or required under the federal securities laws. See Faith Stevelman
Kahn, Transparency and Accountability: Rethinking Corporate Fiduciary Law’s
Relevance to Corporate Disclosure, 34 GA. L. REV. 505, 524 (2000) (“[B]ecause
shareholders’ best interests include being accurately informed about corporate affairs
so that they are afforded a basis for their rational decisionmaking, managers’ fiduciary duties must be understood to apply to the full panoply of official corporate
disclosures routinely made by public corporations.”).
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Amendment to speak to consumers through commercial advertising. 22
When corporations choose to speak to consumers, the discourse norms
that accompany the speech are far less co-operative in nature than are
the norms governing corporate discourse with its fiduciaries. Instead,
the firm’s speech to its consumers reflects “the morals of the marketplace;” it is the kind of speech, in Cardozo’s words, “trodden by the
crowd.” 23
While corporations have a First Amendment right to advertise
legal products, it is permissible for government to restrict false or misleading commercial speech. 24 But the categories “false” and/or “misleading” are of limited utility in analyzing contemporary corporate
speech problems. A ubiquitous advertising campaign associating happiness, health, and vitality with the consumption of junk food is not so
much false or misleading in its failure to with similar zeal describe the

22
In the 1970s, the Court extended First Amendment protection to commercial speech because it was convinced that commercial speech served the same or
similar functions in a free society as does political speech—it helps to inform people
about the existence, availability, and price of goods and services that might be useful
to the well ordering of their lives. Nevertheless there are a few important distinctions
in the First Amendment’s application to commercial speech. The Court has said that
the First Amendment provides no protection to commercial speech that is false or
misleading. This is distinct from the political speech context, wherein the Court has
made clear that government cannot restrict or punish negligently false (or misleading)
speech. The Court gives two justifications for these differences. First, the Court believes that commercial speakers have greater access to the truth or falsity of claims
they may make about their goods or services than non-commercial speakers have
about the truth or falsity of the political, social, theocratic, metaphysical, or moral
claims they make. Second, the Court has stated that the profit motive behind corporate speech assuages the Court’s traditional concern that liability for false speech will
over-deter the production and proliferation of socially useful speech. Thus, the government may forbid false or misleading commercial speech altogether. Where commercial speech is not false or misleading, government may still regulate it provided
the government is doing so to advance a substantial government interest and the
speech regulation is no broader than necessary to vindicate the interest. However, the
Court has definitively held that the government has no legitimate interest in keeping
people from receiving truthful, non-misleading information about goods and services
that are legal. For example, government has no substantial interest, the Court has
held, in limiting advertising for legal goods and services in order to reduce the consumption of such things. Therefore, the Court almost never upholds restrictions on
truthful, non-misleading speech. See David Yosifon, Resisting Deep Capture: The
Commercial Speech Doctrine and Junk Food Advertising to Children, 39 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 507, 543-551 (2006) [hereinafter Resisting Deep Capture] (reviewing commercial speech doctrine).
23
Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464 (1928).
24
See Resisting Deep Capture, supra note 22.
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health risks associated with frequent junk food consumption as it is,
perhaps, incomplete and exploitative. 25
We might describe the discourse norm of the marketplace as one
in which “rhetoric,” in the sense of “insincere speech,” 26 is expected.
That is, ordinary consumers generally know that rhetoric reigns in the
market. But knowledge of its operation does not, unfortunately, rid
rhetoric of its power and influence. Speech in such an idiom can much
more easily manipulate consumers’ perception of the personal or social consequences of consumption than would fiduciary-based speech.
Such consequences can be highly acute and personal, such as the development of lung cancer or heart disease. Or, they may be fartherreaching and more dispersed, such as the destruction of the environment.
The manipulative power of insincere speech is buttressed by the
common law doctrine of “puffery,” which has been incorporated into
modern consumer protection regimes such as the FTC and cognate
state regulatory regimes. The puffery doctrine holds that facially lighthearted boasting, whimsy, exaggeration, and “bluster” are, as a matter of law, not misleading, because reasonable people do not take such
speech seriously. The problem is that human beings are in fact often
influenced by discourse that the law calls “mere” puffery. 27 There are
two lines of evidence for this. The first is social scientific inquiry,
which has demonstrated in controlled experimental settings the influence of puffery. 28 The second line of evidence is the market practice
25
See id. at 520-25 (examining the power of junk food advertising to mislead
consumers with respect to the adverse health consequences associated with habitual
consumption of such products); see also Adam Benforado, Jon Hanson & David
Yosifon, Broken Scales: Obesity and Justice in America, 53 EMORY L. J. 1645, 16911711 (2004) [hereinafter Broken Scales] (reviewing junk food marketing).
26
Lisa M. Fairfax, Easier Said than Done? A Corporate Law Theory for
Actualizing Social Responsibility Rhetoric, 59 FLA. L. REV. 771, 775 (2007).
27
I have previously argued that one practical, constitutionally permissible,
and normatively estimable way of constraining the adverse influence of corporate
advertising is to focus on the extent to which commercial speech is misleading, and
develop a more psychologically informed conception of how human beings can be
misled through manipulation of unseen cognitive and motivational biases and vulnerabilities. See Resisting Deep Capture, supra note 22, at 542-83. But enforcement of
any consumer protection standards by external government administration suffers
from regulatory inefficiencies that are well documented. See The Public Choice Problem in Corporate Law, supra note 8.
28
See, e.g., Gregory S. Carpenter et al., Meaningful Brands from Meaningless Differentiation: The Dependence on Irrelevant Attributes, 31 J. OF MARKETING
RES. 339 (1994). Carpenter and his colleagues designed an experimental setting in
which they asked subjects to rank their preferences for products said to have various
attributes. The experiment deliberately included objectively meaningless bluster in its
description of some product attributes. Id. at 342. For example, in one version of the
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experiment, the researchers presented subjects with hypothetical down jackets, most
of which were said to contain “regular down filling,” but one of which was said to
contain “alpine class down fill.” The latter attribute was wholly meaningless (the
researchers just made up the term and the attribute “alpine class down fill.”). Id.
When asked to evaluate the products the subjects consistently ranked the “alpine class
down fill” jackets as being superior to those described as having regular down fill,
thus “demonstrating that buyers positively value the differentiated brand if the true
value of the irrelevant attribute is not revealed to them.” Id. at 343.
The experimenters explained this outcome by reference to the fact that
their subjects were engaged in a decision-making process characterized by limited
cognitive resources and limited time. (This is true of all subjects, all consumers, and
all humans—our brains and our time on Earth are finite, and thus our ability to take in
and process information about the world around us is limited. See generally The Situational Character, supra note 16 (reviewing social science of human decision-making
and its relevance for legal analysis)). Carpenter et al.’s subjects relied on a host of
cognitive heuristics, short-cuts, and rules-of-thumb, to aid them in their decisionmaking. These decision-making processes can be relatively easily manipulated, as
Carpenter et al.’s study helps to demonstrate. For example, one heuristic that humans
regularly employ, according to social scientists, is a general theory of communication
which holds that “the purpose of communication is to inform, to communicate something not already known.” Carpenter et al., supra note 28, at 341 (citation omitted).
Thus, consumers are cognitively biased towards believing that information communicated to them will be meaningful. Id. Additionally, because our limited cognitive
powers preclude us from assessing every element of circumstances in which we find
ourselves, we tend to focus our evaluative efforts on those elements in a given environment which are most highly salient. This cognitive tendency can be highly useful,
as for example when walking through the woods we might ignore the pallid dynamics
of the bugs or worms in our path and focus instead on the rather vivid Mountain Lion
in front of us. Carpenter et al. argue that these dynamics were at work in their down
jacket study: “[T]he irrelevant attribute makes the differentiated brand distinctive in
consumers’ minds—not only different but more salient, perhaps perceptually dominant, and therefore preferred.” Id. at 341 (citation omitted).
Our cognitive frailties thus leave us vulnerable to manipulation by discursive methods that the law calls “mere” puffery. Unfortunately, the social science also
suggests that the manipulative power of advertising irrelevant product attributes is not
easily cured by simply pointing out the source of the manipulation. After their basic
design, Carpenter et al. took their inquiry a step further. They revealed to their subjects that the term “alpine class down fill” was meaningless, and that the down in
jackets containing it was no different than regular down fill. Even after being informed that the “alpine class down fill” bluster was meaningless, subjects persisted in
evaluating the “alpine class down fill” jackets more favorably than the regular jackets.
Id. at 341-43. “Subjects preferred the differentiated brand regardless of the information revealed to them, suggesting that the primary impact of the irrelevant attribute
was to increase the competitive salience of its brand.” Id. at 344.
Carpenter and his co-authors rightly conclude that findings such as these
cast doubt on the conventional models of consumer behavior that inform many areas
of law and social policy:
Our results are somewhat disquieting for the model of rational choice. Central to this view is the notion that preferences are fixed, exogenous, and
revealed by choice. In this context, more information improves decision
making—better informed consumers make better judgments. Irrelevant in-
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of profit-maximizing corporations which spend billions of dollars per
year on advertising and promotional campaigns which often contain
nothing but puffery. 29 Where firms are operating in competitive markets, corporations that engage in puffery would be quickly subsumed
by those who did not waste precious resources on such efforts, if it
were as inconsequential as the law takes it to be. 30
Corporate law scholars at times appear to believe that loose discursive standards for corporate speech directed at consumers is a
necessary correlate to the command that firms pursue profits for
shareholders. In a remarkable article on the problem of “half-truths”
in corporate speech, Donald Langevoort argues that whether a “halftruth” should give rise to a shareholder cause of action for securities
fraud depends on to whom the “half-truth” was directed. 31 If a firm
tells a “half-truth” about the quality of its products, but directs the
statement to consumers rather than shareholders, then shareholders
should not have a cause of action. The reason for this, according to
Langevoort, is that shareholders stand to gain from such half-truths
being spoken to consumers, and therefore the shareholders should
have no complaint about them. It is expected that directors will exaggerate the firm’s strengths when dealing with non-shareholders
formation in such a framework is immaterial and should not affect decisions. We show that irrelevant information does indeed have an impact. A
brand attribute may not have objective value. Rather, preferences for it may
be constructed in response to the context in which valuation is made. This
suggests that, contrary to the model of rational choice, preferences are endogenous, that is, constructed rather than revealed, and more information
can bias decisions systematically.
Id. at 348 (citation omitted). Findings such as these cast doubt in particular, I argue,
on the shareholder primacy theory of corporate law, which presumes that the profitmotive serves not just shareholder interests but also consumer interests, by forcing
firms to discern consumer interests and serve them. If it is true, as the social science
suggests, that corporations can often pursue profits for shareholders by manipulating
or misleading consumers, rather than discerning and serving consumer desires, then
we may have reason to doubt the social utility of shareholder primacy in firm governance. See also Resisting Deep Capture, supra note 22, at 525-38 (reviewing contradictions between the law’s assumptions and social science’s conclusions about the
power of puffery).
29
See Resisting Deep Capture, supra note 22, at 521.
30
This may be overstated, for it may not be that puffery is not wholly meaningless or that it has no effect, but merely that it does not mislead or confuse. Perhaps puffery creates a sense of whimsy and excitement, and provides opportunity for
identity formation and expression which is desirable and fun. So even if it is a little
destructive in some ways, it is not unduly so, given its utility in other ways. In either
event, it remains true that discourse norms in the marketplace are far less demanding
than are the explicitly co-operative norms regulating corporate speech to shareholders.
31
Langevoort, supra note 17.
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because this will make it easier for them to get better deals for shareholders: “[C]ompany executives have a strong incentive to style general corporate publicity to conform to a desirable image . . . that image-making is said to be necessary to capture desired resources for the
firm from among a broad array of constituents, both internal and external.” 32 And therefore, “[e]xpressions of optimism should not be
actionable in those settings where hype is most commonplace: the
kinds of statements made with customer and employee audiences
largely in mind.” 33 If I understand Langevoort correctly, his point is
that “half-truths” should not be actionable precisely because they can
influence non-shareholders in a manner beneficial to shareholders. It
thus appears that what is part of the solution for shareholders is part of
the problem for non-shareholders.
b. Pushing Past the Pareto Fallacy of Corporate Profitability
Conversations about corporate governance and the relationship
between various stakeholders in corporate enterprise sometimes degenerate into what I call “the Pareto fallacy of corporate profitability.” 34
The fallacy is the view that, in the end, boards of directors will always
maximize profits for shareholders if they make decisions that are also
in the best interest of workers, consumers, and the community atlarge. The fallacy assumes that worker-friendly decisions will attract
and retain the best workers, and consumer friendly decisions will attract and retain the most loyal consumers, thereby ensuring maximum
returns to shareholders. Under this view, there is no conflict between
shareholder interests and stakeholder interests, so long as corporate
boards sufficiently seize the synergies available to them. 35

32

Id. at 107.
Id. at 122.
34
Economists usefully distinguish between two kinds of efficiency. The first
and best kind is called “Pareto” efficiency. A Pareto efficient rule or proposed alteration to a rule is one which makes at least one person better-off, and which makes
nobody worse off. Pareto efficiency is so comely a thing that it probably deserves a
better name. A second kind of efficiency, also good but not great, is “Kaldor-Hicks”
efficiency, which refers to a rule or proposal which would improve the lot of one
person more than it would harm the lot of another, but it makes no promises as to
distributional consequences. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is only potentially beautiful. It
requires either some justification for the distributional burdens occasioned by its
operation, or else it requires some additional rule or program to ensure that the efficiency gains realized from the rule are somehow transferred to compensate the parties
harmed on the way to increasing the overall social pie. See RICHARD POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 12-17 (7th ed. 2007).
35
Such assumptions about the reconcilability of corporate social responsibility and profitability were already widespread enough for E. Merrick Dodd, Jr. to
33
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To be sure, there is plenty of evidence that some corporations
sometimes can do best for their shareholders by doing good for all
corporate stakeholders. 36 There are some investment funds which inreference, and critique them, in his famous 1932 essay, For Whom Are Corporate
Managers Trustees:
No doubt it is to a large extent true that an attempt by business managers to
take into consideration the welfare of employees and consumers . . . will in
the long run increase the profits of stockholders. As Dean Donham and others have demonstrated, it is the lack of a feeling of security on the part of
those who are dependent on employment for their livelihood which is largely responsible for the present under-consumption which has so disastrous an
effect upon business profits. . . . And yet one need not be unduly credulous
to feel that there is more to this talk of social responsibility on the part of
corporation managers than merely a more intelligent appreciation of what
tends to the ultimate benefit of their stockholders.
45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1156-1157. The reconcilability of responsibility and profits
continues to be a theme in contemporary scholarship and public policy debate. See,
e.g., STEVEN ROCHLIN ET AL., STATE OF CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP IN THE U.S.: A VIEW
FROM INSIDE 2003-2004 4 (2004) (“[B]usiness executives see corporate citizenship as
a fundamental part of business. . . . 82 percent of executives surveyed say that good
corporate
citizenship
helps
the
bottom
line.”),
available
at
http://bclc.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/files/04stateccreport.pdf; Cherie Metcalf,
Corporate Social Responsibility as Global Public Law: Third Party Rankings as
Regulation by Information, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 145, 158-59 (2010) (“[C]orporate
social responsibility may enhance profitability through increased employee productivity or reduced labor costs. . . . The adoption of corporate social responsibility commitments can serve as a way to screen employees and allow firms to pay reduced
wages or gain loyalty and productivity thereby enhancing profitability.”); Robert
Sprague, Beyond Shareholder Value: Normative Standards for Sustainable Corporate
Governance, 1 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 47, 77 (2010) (“[Scholars have] found that
‘consumers are willing to pay substantially more for ethically produced goods, suggesting that there is a financial reward for socially responsible behavior.’”) (citation
omitted); Reena De Asis, Corporate Giving and the Social Economy, HUFFINGTON
POST (Mar. 13, 2011, 12:56 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/reena-deasis/corporate-giving-and-the-_b_833626.html (“Corporate giving can be strategic
while also being a valuable investment in the community. One major strategic benefit
is an increase in brand awareness that can result in a competitive edge.”).
36
The urtext of this fallacy is the example of Johnson & Johnson Inc.’s reaction to the cyanide-in-the-Tylenol scandal of 1982. After a still-unknown malefactor
laced several bottles of Tylenol in the Chicago area with cyanide, the company was
quickly and fully forthcoming about the risk, pulled all of its products off store
shelves at substantial short-term cost to the company, and came back to the market
with substantially improved safety mechanisms. Such forthright conduct was widely
credited with helping the firm to quickly regain its market share after the crisis. See
Lisa Hope Nicholson, Culture is the Key to Employee Adherence to Corporate Codes
of Ethics, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 449, 453 n.27 (2008). Johnson & Johnson had made
good on its much ballyhooed credo of putting the health of its customers first among
its corporate priorities. This credo, which was crafted by company founders before the
firm went public in 1943, explicitly puts the interest of consumers ahead of those of
shareholders: “We believe our first responsibility is to the doctors, nurses and patients, to mothers and fathers and all others who use our products and services. In
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vest only in firms that are “socially responsible.” Some of these funds
have outperformed investment funds without “social responsibility”
restrictions or purposes. 37 It is not at all surprising that corporate operations that actually serve the interests of all stakeholders would be
among the best performing firms in the market. But this success in no
way casts doubt on the fact that there are other profit opportunities
that are available in more exploitative arrangements that lie beyond
the parameters of the social responsibility investment funds, but well
within the parameters of the law. There is plenty of evidence that
there are times when the profitable thing is for a corporation to act
sharp with one of its stakeholders. Just because the forty dollars lying
on the ground at the top of the sunny hill will be seen and gathered
does not mean that the twenty dollars buried under the ground in the
dark valley will be left alone. 38
meeting their needs everything we do must be of high quality. We must constantly
strive to reduce our costs in order to maintain reasonable prices.” Our Credo,
JOHNSON
&
JOHNSON
INC.,
http://www.jnj.com/wps/wcm/connect/c7933f004f5563df9e22be1bb31559c7/ourcredo.pdf?MOD=AJPERES. Only after reviewing the firm’s obligations to other
stakeholders, including “employees” and “communities,” does the credo in its concluding paragraph state, “Our final responsibility is to our stockholders. Business
must make a sound profit. . . . When we operate according to these principles [of the
credo], the stockholders should realize a fair return.” Id.
Nevertheless, the cyanide-in-the-Tylenol case notwithstanding, there is
plenty of other evidence that manipulation and exploitation has also been an important part of the firm’s overall pursuit of profits. For example, Johnson & Johnson
recently agreed to an $81 million settlement with the federal government in connection with alleged civil and criminal violations of statutory prohibitions against the
marketing of prescription drugs for treatments not approved by the Food and Drug
Administration. This off-label marketing practice was purportedly undertaken through
corporate subsidiaries of Johnson & Johnson, Inc. The firms allegedly marketed drugs
that were approved only for the treatment of epilepsy as also useful in the treatment of
obesity, a use which may have put patients at risk for serious health problems. See
Press Release, Department of Justice, Two Johnson & Johnson Subsidiaries to Pay
Over $81 Million to Resolve Allegations of Off-Label Promotion of Topomax (Apr.
29, 2010) available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/April/10-civ-500.html.
37
See Olaf Weber, Marco Mansfeld, & Eric Schirrmann, The Financial
Performance of SRI Funds Between 2002 and 2009 (June 25, 2010) (unpublished) (on
file
with
HEALTH
MATRIX),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1630502. Then again, “sin stock”
funds—comprised of firms trading in alcohol, tobacco, weapons, and pornography—
also have outperformed the S&P 500. See Charles Sizemore, Why Good Investors
Like “Bad” Stocks, MINYAVILLE MEDIA, INC. (Aug. 31, 2010, 3:15 PM),
http://www.minyanville.com/investing/articles/sin-stock-vice-fund-playboystock/8/31/2010/id/29891.
38
See Claire A. Hill, Why Financial Appearances Might Matter: An Explanation for “Dirty Pooling” and Some Other Types of Financial Cosmetics, 22 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 141, 186 n.156 (1997):

206

HEALTH MATRIX

[Vol. 21:189

It is therefore important to emphasize that the problems that corporate law presents for non-shareholders cannot be remedied by hoping for better corporate governance within the shareholder primacy
paradigm. The Pareto fallacy of corporate profitability debilitates
honest discussion and communication about hard choices that need to
be made in social policy.
In its most complete articulation, shareholder primacy theory is
not committed to the claim that shareholder primacy in firm governance will always serve all stakeholder interests. Instead, the dominant view is dependent upon the idea that government regulation can
protect non-shareholders from corporate misconduct where contract
proves an inadequate mechanism to protect non-shareholders from the
exploitative power of the shareholder primacy firm. 39 The trouble is
that shareholder primacy itself compels firms to work within the political realm to undermine the development of such profit-stifling regulations. In other work I have analyzed the broad public choice dynamics which inhibit the proper functioning of the political systems on
which shareholder primacy theory relies for its coherence. 40 Here I am
concerned with analyzing in particular the irreconcilability of the discourse norms that govern corporate political speech, on the one hand,
[A]ccording to a famous, but perhaps apocryphal, story, a University of
Chicago economist and a student were walking together. The student saw
$20 on the floor, and pointed it out to the economist, remarking ‘Look!
There’s $20 on the floor. Aren’t you going to pick it up?’ The economist’s
response, purportedly, was to say ‘Naah; there can’t be a $20 bill on the
floor. Somebody would have picked it up,’ and continue walking, without
even glancing down.
Lisa Fairfax argues that corporations in the last ten years have engaged in
historically unprecedented levels of “rhetoric” regarding corporate social responsibility. The impressive empirical investigation she undertook seems largely to show that
there is little connection between such rhetoric and socially responsible corporate
conduct. Fairfax, supra note 26, at 789-92. Fairfax states:
62% of Fortune 100 companies are not included in the Domini 400 Social
Index . . . only seventeen companies in the Fortune 100 appear on the list of
the top 100 Best Corporate Citizens, a list which comprises the public companies that best serve stakeholders, including stockholders, employees, customers, the community, and the environment. . . . The fact that only 17% of
Fortune 100 companies appear on this list while 98% of such companies
embrace rhetoric suggesting a responsibility towards stakeholders reflects a
seeming divergence between corporate rhetoric and reality.
Id.
39
See The Public Choice Problem in Corporate Law, supra note 8.
40
Because of their size, narrow interests, technical skills, and wealth, corporations enjoy collective action advantages over workers and consumers in the competition for regulatory favor. Thus, corporations can regularly stymie the development
of external regulations on which shareholder primacy theory relies for its coherence.
See The Public Choice Problem in Corporate Law, supra note 8.
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and those that are expected in the arena of political speech, on the
other.
c. Corporate Political Speech and the Norm of Public Reason
Modern liberal political theory considers speech to be an essential
element of legitimacy in social organization. 41 Political theorists argue
that people have a fundamental moral obligation to speak with each
other about proposed solutions to hard and contested problems. 42
Speaking with each other provides us a non-violent, orderly, reasonable way of getting along with each other even though we may strongly
disagree about important matters. 43
It is not just any speech, but rather a particular kind of restrained
speech which is needed if society is to successfully evade the destructive threat of other forms of dispute resolution, such as fighting. The
liberal political tradition has developed a discourse norm of “public
reason” which purports to fit the bill. The norm of public reason differs from the discourse norms evident in family, fiduciary, contractual, or legal-adversarial relationships. The purpose of the norm of
public reason is “to identify normative premises all political participants find reasonable (or at least, not unreasonable).” 44 The norm of
41

See Bruce Ackerman, Why Dialogue?, 86 J. PHIL. 5, 6 (1989).
Ackerman calls this obligation to speak “the supreme pragmatic imperative.” Id. at 10.
43
See id. at 9. An economically oriented theorist might argue that a far better
way through which social arrangements receive legitimacy is through voluntary exchange in free markets. Prices—more particularly, the willingness to pay a price and
the willingness to accept payment in exchange for a certain outcome—provides a far
better basis of legitimacy than the minutes of any meeting ever could. But this kind of
market legitimacy is only fully reliable when the distributional status-quo is legitimate. See id. at 10-11 (“Of course, once I agree that those bricks over there are
rightfully called ‘yours,’ and you agree that this beer over here is rightfully ‘mine,’
we may then side-step our [other] moral disagreements by trading away to our hearts’
content.”). In Capitalism and Freedom, Milton Friedman argues that the legitimacy
problems of the distributional status quo can only be shown with reference to the
adverse consequences of altering them. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND
FREEDOM 161-77 (1982). Friedman emphasizes the power of the “payment in accordance with product” principle in facilitating voluntary, private coordination of enterprise. Id. at 162. According to Friedman, radical redistribution of wealth, even intergenerationally, would rob society of the utility of the “payment in accordance with
product” principle. Of course, it does not seem that Friedman’s principle would be
upended if wealth accumulated through violence, exploitation, or sham was redistributed. Id. Whatever one thinks of Friedman’s argument, notice that it is perfectly in
keeping with Ackerman’s primary injunction to explain in words why we should go
along with a social design. Friedman’s essay is an exercise in legitimation, and a
vindication of the view that only speech can give full legitimacy to market exchange.
44
Ackerman, supra note 41, at 17.
42
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public reason thus requires individuals to discuss and resolve conflicts
in a manner which does not require either party to “lose” in the deep
sense of being put in a position where they have to renounce their
particular moral commitments in favor of their opponent’s. To comply
with the norm of public reason, speakers must therefore justify their
public policy preferences in a manner that does not appeal to any distinct world-view. Instead of appealing to the authority of a totalizing
(religious or secular) conception of the meaning and purpose of life,
the norm of public reason enjoins us to articulate and defend our public policy positions with reference only to social values that are common to all world-views.
But this is not mere acting. An important element in the discourse
norm of public reason is that political interlocutors must be (justifiably) disposed to believe each other’s speech. The norm of public reason thus requires speakers to believe in good faith that their preferred
public policy advances an overlapping conception of a socially desirable outcome. To conform to the norm of public reason, you must
really believe what you say, and not secretly prefer a policy simply
because it advances one’s privately valued world view. The discourse
norm of public reason therefore requires sincerity. 45
One big problem with the norm of public reason, as Dan Kahan
argues, is that as a cognitive matter we humans cannot really pull it
off. 46 Social psychologists have demonstrated that most people quite
easily, and sincerely, believe that they themselves routinely conform
their public-oriented thoughts and expression to the requirements of
public reason, but they are doubtful that other people do the same.
Social psychologists tell us that in these assessments we are usually
right about other people and wrong about ourselves. Human thinking
and decision-making is profoundly influenced by cognitive biases and
self-serving motivations. 47 While people genuinely believe that they
analyze public policy problems “objectively,” we in fact tend to assess
45

It is important to emphasize that I am concerned here with exploring the
contradictions between the kind of speech prescribed by canonical accounts of corporate theory, on the one hand, and liberal political theory on the other. I am not
attempting to characterize extant patterns of political speech. Nevertheless, other
scholars have made the claim that participants in mainstream political discourse do
endeavor to conform to the norm of public reason. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The
Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 118 (2007).
46
See id.
47
See id. at 129-131; see also The Situational Character, supra note 16, at
90-120 (reviewing social psychological studies regarding both the ubiquity of motivated reasoning in human thinking and the tendency of people to be blind to the influence of such motivations on their own thinking even as they readily diagnose motivated reasoning in others).
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policy debates through the biased frameworks of our own personal
“world-views” (i.e., our private “preferences about how society
should be organized.”). 48 We accurately diagnose this dynamic in our
interlocutors, even as we are blind to it in ourselves. The term that
social psychologists have settled on for this ironic epistemological
dynamic is “naïve realism”—we are naïve about ourselves, realistic
about others. We thus tend to view our interlocutors, especially those
whose world views we do not share, as only pretending to conform to
the norm of public reason. And they think the same of us. 49
Kahan argues that since we are cognitively incapable of truly conforming to the norm of public reason, even people’s good-faith efforts
to conform to it are likely only to antagonize their opponents, who
must now contend not only with an adversary whose world view they
oppose, but an adversary who is lying about the relationship between

48
See Kahan, supra note 45, 122. Drawing on psychological and anthropological research, Kahan identifies four basic world-view types which subconsciously
inform people’s thinking about public policy problems: “communitarians” who “favor
a . . . social order in which the needs and interests of individuals are subordinated to
the collective”; “individualists” who desire a “society . . . in which individuals are
responsible for securing their own well-being without collective assistance or interference”; “hierarchalists” who support a social order “in which . . . opportunities . . .
and obligations are distributed on the basis of largely fixed social attributes, such as
gender, ethnicity, lineage, and class”; and “egalitarians” who favor a society in which
such fixed attributes “play no role in the . . . distribution of . . . opportunities . . . [and]
obligations.” Id. at 122-23. The accuracy of this particular categorization scheme is
less important for present purposes than is the general claim that our “world-views”
subconsciously influence our public policy assessments even as we view ourselves as
thinking through such problems an objective, unbiased fashion.
49
Consider the public-health related example of tobacco regulation. Proponents of smoking regulations endeavor to conform to the norm of public reason and
“invoke secular rationales: reducing the public health costs of treating lung cancer
victims, and abating the risk of disease or the simple annoyance associated with ingesting ‘second-hand smoke.’” Id. at 136 (citations omitted). Smokers and other
opponents of tobacco regulation are suspicious of these justifications and “detect the
unmistakable signature of animus toward the cultural values that smoking expresses.”
Id. at 137. Opponents of smoking regulation, meanwhile, also publicly conform their
arguments to the norm of public reason, pointing to studies which show that smoking
actually reduces public health care expenditures (because smokers die much younger
than non-smokers), or by arguing that because drinking and driving causes far more
harm than does second-hand smoke, public health advocates should turn their attention to restricting drinking in bars rather than forbidding smoking in bars. Id. at 13839. Advocates of tobacco regulation look past such secular arguments and see instead
opponents motivated by “a constellation of negative values, such as weakness, crudeness, and irrationality, along with a culpable heedlessness of social obligation.” Id. at
137.
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their world view and the polices they support. This antagonizes social
strife. 50
If we analyze the norm of public reason in connection with corporate social and political speech this problem is particularly evident. 51
Firms endeavor to comply with the norm of public reason in their
political speech. 52 But they do not succeed. We know that there are
profound institutional biases and motivations behind the speech; in
particular biases and motivations favoring the narrow interests of directors and shareholders, rather than the public good generally. Corporate speakers may believe in good faith that they fully conform to
the norm of public reason. After all, corporate lobbyists are not corporate law scholars or psychologists. They are fully immersed within the
norm of public reason and the Pareto fallacy of corporate profitability,
50

But see Ackerman, supra note 41, at 20-21. Ackerman argues that the
norm of public reason is not all that difficult for humans, as is evidenced by our continual compliance with the myriad discourse norms that govern different aspects of
our lives:
To be a competent social actor, I must constantly engage in a process of selective repression—restraining the impulse to speak the truth on a vast
number of role-irrelevant matters so as to get on with the particular form of
life in which I am presently engaged. . . . Rather than assault the very idea
of role playing, it seems wiser to seek relief in the marvelous human capacity to shift role engagements over time. I can be a lawyer, teacher, construction worker, father, baseball coach—as well as a liberal citizen.
Id. The difference between Ackerman and Kahan is the difference between intuition
and social science. Ackerman’s common sense leaves him confident in our capacities
for objectivity; Kahan relies on experimental evidence demonstrating that in important ways that confidence is misplaced.
51
As with advertising, corporations are as a matter of constitutional law
entitled to engage in this political speech. See The Public Choice Problem in Corporate Law, supra note 8.
52
For example, junk food corporations have spent millions of dollars to fund
a substantial amount of political speech organized through issue advocacy groups,
political advertising, and local, state, and federal lobbying efforts. See generally
MARION NESTLE, FOOD POLITICS: HOW THE FOOD INDUSTRY INFLUENCES NUTRITION,
AND HEALTH (Darra Goldstein ed., 2002) (reviewing food industry efforts to influence
food regulation); MICHELE SIMON, APPETITE FOR PROFIT (2006) (reviewing food industry influence on political process). In these arenas the industry has not argued
against restrictions on the sale and advertising of junk food on the grounds that such
regulations would diminish profits and would be bad for their shareholders. Instead,
the industry has in its political speech adopted a public interest idiom that has focused
on the idea that restrictions on junk food regulations should not be adopted because
they would undermine individual responsibility and diminish consumer choice. See
Broken Scales, supra note 25, at 1769-1802. Among other accomplishments, these
efforts have resulted in the adoption of laws forbidding lawsuits against food corporations for obesity-related harms in at least twenty-three states. David Burnett, FastFood Lawsuits and the Cheeseburger Bill: Critiquing Congress’s Response to the
Obesity Epidemic, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 357, 365 (2007).
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contentedly telling their political interlocutors that corporate profitability makes all stakeholders better off. 53 So the agents of corporate
social and political speech may believe they have conformed to the
norm of public reason just as sincerely as do regular people. But they
are no more successful at it.
The incompatibility between the norm of public reason and the
dynamics of corporate speech has two iniquitous effects. The first is
that while corporations often succeed in achieving the policies they
promote, such policies are not reliably in the public interest, but are
instead reflective of corporate bias and motivation, which is shareholder primacy. The second consequence is that, for reasons Kahan
makes clear, the public and policymakers are largely suspicious and
resentful of corporate political speech. It may be that the “merely”
sincere adherence to the norm of public reason by firms operating in
the political realm is what helps give rise to the abiding skepticism
and animosity that Americans have towards corporations. 54 The juxtaposition of professed objectivity or public spirit with the bias that we
otherwise know they have is particularly galling. One survey from
2002 found that 70 percent of Americans “did not trust what . . . corporations told them and 60 percent called corporate wrongdoing ‘a
widespread problem.’” 55
The discourse norms that animate corporate speech inevitably
clash with the norm of public reason, deepening our cynicism about
the legitimacy of both corporations and government. Corporate political speech advances the firm’s mission of corporate profitability, but
it inhibits the mission of political speech in a free society. In particular, it precludes the full development of consumer, worker, and envi53

See, e.g., Steven Brill, On Sale: Your Government. Why Lobbying is
Washington’s Best Bargain, TIME, July 12, 2010, at 28. Brill quotes Dave Wenhold,
President of the American League of Lobbyists:
If you banned all lobbying tomorrow, the legislative process would grind to
a halt. You can call us special interests, but the ones who are especially interested are the ones who can explain the consequences of writing a bill this
way or that way. We make the system work.
Id. at 28. Another trade-association executive interviewed by Brill argued:
Most members [of Congress] may know one or two issues well, if that.
Then you have a 26-year old kid, maybe he’s [sic] even 30 and went to a
good law school, who’s on the staff working 10 hours a day and is supposed to tell his [sic] boss how to do derivatives regulation or credit-card
reform. Are you kidding?
Id. at 32.
54
Many studies describe a widespread “distrust” of corporations. See, e.g.,
Fairfax, supra note 26, at 787.
55
JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT
HISTORY OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 152 (2003).
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ronmental protection regimes that are needed before shareholder primacy in corporate governance can be sanctified. 56

II. REFORMING CORPORATE LAW THROUGH
PRESCRIPTIVE DISCOURSE NORMS
I assert that the discourse norms attending corporations’ relationships with their various stakeholders are themselves part of the default
terms that comprise corporate law’s enabling regime. The discourse
norms provide rules of construction for the express speech (or silence)
of the corporation to or about its stakeholders. Like corporate law
itself, these norms are neither necessary nor inevitable—they are prescribed as part of a social construction project enabled by positive
law. The default discourse norms that we find in corporate law get
their justification from shareholder primacy theory, which I have argued is wanting. Corporate law might thus consider an alteration in
the discourse norms that govern the firm’s relationship with different
stakeholders.
A. The Utility of Multi-Fiduciary Discourse
Progressive corporate law scholars have suggested that an alternative to shareholder primacy might be a corporate governance
regime that requires directors to actively attend to the interests of multiple stakeholders at the level of firm governance. 57 In a multistakeholder regime directors would be charged with attending to the
interests of all of the firm’s stakeholders with care and loyalty. Such a
regime could be enforced the same way that fiduciary obligations are
presently enforced by corporate law: by imposing discourse obligations on directors. Under a multi-stakeholder regime directors would
be required to become informed about and discuss—in the honest,
complete, good-faith fashion of fiduciary discourse—the impact of
corporate plans on multiple stakeholders’ interests. Under a multifiduciary regime, workers and consumers would be entitled to such
corporate speech, just as shareholders are entitled to it now. In this
section, I examine the possibility of using prescriptive discourse
norms as a means of institutionalizing multiple-stakeholder corporate
governance.
Fiduciary discourse is not an end in itself; it is a mechanism
through which “trust” can be developed and managed. Trust is valua56

See supra text accompanying notes 13-14.
See The Consumer Interest in Corporate Law, supra note 4 at 295-311
(examining the possibility of multi-stakeholder corporate governance).
57
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ble in the corporate context because it can serve as a highly efficient
solution to the “agency problem” that corporate stakeholders face
when turning control of firm resources over to the board of directors. 58 While we may reserve the highest forms of trust for our most
intimate associations, it is very clear that trust does not require “thick”
relationships. 59 Trust is an important component in our personal, professional, and consumer lives. 60 To greater or lesser degrees, we may
trust that individuals within an organization or institution will “take
our interests into account when determining what course of action to
pursue.” 61
Before corporate stakeholders can trust a firm’s board of directors, however, the board must behave in a trustworthy fashion. The
difficulty of obtaining trustworthy conduct by boards is, again, the
fundamental problem that corporate law scholars have traditionally
assessed from the shareholder perspective. An important part of the
solution that corporate law uses to engender this fidelity involves the
imposition of discourse norms on board operations. That is, one of the
ways that corporate law gets directors to behave in a trustworthy fashion is by requiring directors to engage in speech acts expressing and
analyzing the interests they are charged with pursuing. 62 This mechanism can also be deployed to deepen directors’ ties to multiple stakeholders. The active expression of commitment introduces a crucial
psychological dynamic. Human beings are deeply motivated to see
themselves, and to be seen by others, as consistent and coherent
across different behavioral and decision-making contexts. 63 Expressions of commitment can thus lay the tracks for future conduct that
will be consistent with the commitment, as we are loath to view ourselves as hypocritical or contradictory. 64 Social psychologists have
58

See supra text accompanying notes 12-13.
Michael R. Siebecker, Trust & Transparency: Promoting Efficient Corporate Disclosure Through Fiduciary-Based Discourse, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 115, 152
(2009).
60
“Trust” is an important component to relationships that lie between being,
on the one hand “determinate,” as where incentives and enforcement are very strong
and aligned, and those on the other hand that are fully “indeterminate,” as when we
have no reason to expect a particular course of behavior. RUSSEL HARDIN, TRUST AND
TRUSTWORTHINESS 12 (2002); see also Claire A. Hill & Erin Ann O’Hara, A Cognitive Theory of Trust, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1717, 1724 (2006).
61
Siebecker, supra note 59, at 146.
62
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
63
See The Situational Character, supra note 16, at 91-100, 107-14.
64
Fairfax, supra note 26, at 776. There is evidence that putting one’s commitments in writing, and signing them, has a particularly powerful impact in terms of
internalization and identifying with a commitment, perhaps also with the group with
whom one is signing the oath or statement. Id.
59
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shown that articulating a particular perspective can change the underlying attitude of the person speaking even where the speech act is in
the first instance prescribed by a “role” rather than the private, subjective feelings or thoughts. 65 This relationship between speech, commitment, and behavior happens automatically in our subconscious
cognitive processing. 66
In addition to being motivated to view ourselves as consistent and
coherent, we human beings are also motivated to be viewed positively
by the groups with which we associate ourselves. 67 Corporate law also
harnesses this fundamental psychological drive to help spur trustworthy behavior by corporate directors. A corporate board is a collegial
body that can induce the desire for group affirmation in the hearts and
minds of its members. Again, the director’s obligation to speak her
commitments stokes this powerful commitment mechanism. When a
director promises to attend to the interests of multiple stakeholders
before a group of other directors, who are making the same promise,
she will tend to keep her commitment more consistently than if she
just says it to herself, or thinks it to herself. The director knows that
others will be watching and will hold her accountable if she malingers
or cheats—by shunning her, refusing to support her reappointment the
board, or refusing to invite her to serve on other corporate or civic
boards with which they are associated. Professor Bainbridge considers
this power of the “reputational” community to be an important reason
why corporate law requires firms to be managed by a “board” and not
by the fiat of a single individual. 68 Bainbridge wants this power to be
deployed in advance of shareholder primacy, 69 but it can also help
enable a loyal, capable multi-stakeholder corporate governance regime.
Another important member of the corporate reputational community is the Delaware Court of Chancery. A number of scholars have
emphasized the role that the Chancery Court plays in exposing, condemning, and shaming directorial misconduct, even where the court
restrains itself from imposing actual liability or damages for the mis-

65

Id. at 777; see also Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep
Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 169 (2003).
66
See Fairfax, supra note 26, at 801; see generally Hanson & Yosifon, supra
note 65 (emphasizing important part played by unseen cognitive and motivational
processes on conscious thinking and action).
67
See The Situational Character, supra note 16, at 100-15.
68
See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 11, at 100-05.
69
See id. at 104.
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conduct it identifies. 70 The world of corporate directors is a fairly
small one. In it, reputation and honor often matter more than pecuniary rewards, which most directors of large publicly traded corporations already have before joining the world of corporate directorships.
In this culture what Delaware judges say matters as much or more
than what judges do. Formally expanding the fiduciary relationship to
multiple stakeholders would provide judges the occasion to celebrate
or condemn corporate conduct as it relates to workers, consumers and
other stakeholders, even where the Chancery Court is reluctant to
formally find directors liable for damages in connection with unworthy conduct.
The canonical account of corporate law is already committed to
the view that reputational dynamics can serve an important part in
bonding corporate directors to their principals. In fact, in the canonical
account the competence of board members to police each other and
keep each other true (enough) to the corporate mission serves as a
crucial justification for corporate law’s embrace of near total directorial discretion over the corporation’s affairs, even to the extent that
it allows directors to stymie the market for corporate control with
structural defenses (e.g., “poison pills,” etc.) that essentially allow the
board to “just say no” to hostile takeovers. 71 The acid bath of the market is kept lidded, while corporate law puts its faith in the fidelity of
the board. This faith and this power, driven by speech acts operating
under fiduciary discourse norms, can be put to use in service of a
broader set of directorial commitments.
Of course, people’s ability to fulfill commitments degenerates
when multiple commitments present conflicts. Lisa Fairfax argues that
corporations actively concerned with multiple stakeholders may need
to resolve this problem by limiting the number of groups to which
they make commitments, or else to be clear about their hierarchy of
commitments. 72 Yet to respond to this conundrum as Fairfax suggests
70
See, e.g., Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1013-1016 (1997) (arguing that “Delaware
opinions can be understood as providing a set of parables—instructive tales—of good
managers and bad managers”; these tales then “provide a supplemental source of
gossip, criticism, and sanction for this set of actors [i.e., directors and officers]”); see
also Lyman Johnson, Counter-Narrative in Corporate Law: Saints and Sinners,
Apostles and Epistles, 2009 MICH. STATE L. REV. 847 (2009) (extending Rock’s thesis
with special reference to the role of the business press).
71
See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 11, at 134-53.
72
Fairfax, supra note 26, at 816 n.223 (“Indeed, the consistency principle
suggests that the multiplicity problem may undermine achievement of all the goals
encompassed by the stakeholder rhetoric, including goals associated with shareholder
concerns.”). This is precisely the problem, and the reason why behavioral insights
about trust discourse must not be used to try to deepen shareholder primacy.
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would leave us again with shareholder primacy in firm governance, an
approach which leaves non-shareholding stakeholders vulnerable to
corporate overreaching.
The inevitable conflict involved in multiple commitments has
been one of the main arguments that advocates of shareholder primacy
have used to reject the plausibility of multi-stakeholder corporate governance. This is sometimes referred to as the “two masters” problem:
“[A] manager told to serve two masters (a little for the equity holders,
a little for the community) has been freed from both and is answerable
to neither.” 73 But the “two masters” argument proves too much. Under
the prevailing shareholder-primacy model of corporate governance,
directors are already charged with managing conflicts between many
different masters. For example, shareholders with a large portion of
their wealth invested in one firm would prefer the firm to adopt a riskaverse business strategy, but diversified shareholders would prefer
their firms to be more risk-preferring. Older, infirm, or impatient
shareholders want short-term profits, while younger, healthier or more
patient shareholders want to wait on steady growth. Preferred stockholders prefer certain-short term gains but common stockholders prefer riskier long-term strategies. Some shareholders want profits without regard to ethical consequences, other investors are willing to ease
up on the profit throttle if it means doing less harm to others. Proponents of shareholder primacy in firm governance have not considered
the inevitable conflicts in simultaneous commitments to these different groups of shareholders to be an insurmountable problem. Instead,
the inevitability of conflicts between different groups of shareholders
is advanced as one of the key reasons why corporations must be run
by an independent, authoritative board of directors which can manage
such conflicts in a way that best serves the interests of all competing
parties. 74 Directors presently do this with almost no guidance from
courts or statutory law as to whose interests are to be privileged in
what circumstances when conflicts inevitably arise. The confidence
that corporate law already evinces in directors’ ability to overcome the
two-masters problem across different groups of shareholders should
also serve to assuage doubts that directors can effectively manage
conflicts across different groups of stakeholders.

73

FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 38 (1991). The “two masters” formulation is an allusion to the Gospel of Matthew. Matthew 6:24 (Revised Standard Version) (“No one can serve two
masters; for either he will either hate the one and love the other, he will or be devoted
to one and despise the other. You cannot serve God and mammon.”).
74
See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 11, at 45-50, 60-65.
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Nevertheless, the reality of conflicts between different stakeholders should be reflected in the discursive practices of multi-stakeholder
corporate governance. Directorial speech about stakeholders need not
always be concerned with maximizing trust. Indeed, once trust has
been established in a relationship, our motive for coherence and the
threat of dissonance sometimes keeps us trusting too much, which can
leave us vulnerable to manipulation. 75 We tend in our explanations of
our behavior (to ourselves and others) to minimize the inconsistency
in competing obligations in order to reduce the cognitive dissonance
we would otherwise suffer. 76 As Claire Hill and Erin Ann O’Hara
recently pointed out, social policy should be concerned not with
“maximizing” trust, but with optimizing it. 77 The discursive goal of
corporate speech must then be clarity and honesty, rather than necessarily trust-inducing in every case. Directors should be encouraged to
recognize conflicts between stakeholders and to communicate openly
and honestly about them.
B. Prescriptive Discourse Norms
Corporate law scholarship must help boards of directors to develop effective ways of engaging in multi-stakeholder discourse. In this
section I briefly examine two different “prescriptive” discourse norms
authored by two leading scholars for use in other areas, but which I
think might usefully be deployed to help develop a new default discourse norm for use in multi-stakeholder corporate governance.
1. Expressive Overdetermination in Firm Governance
Earlier, I reviewed Dan Kahan’s critique of the norm of public
reason, and showed the ways in which his critique is relevant to the
problems of corporate political speech. 78 Kahan follows his critique
with the offer of an alternative discourse norm that he argues is psychologically realistic and more instrumentally promising than the
norm of public reason. He urges the adoption of “expressive overdetermination”—a norm with a somewhat cumbersome name, but one
which is nevertheless well worth considering. Expressive overdetermination has two basic elements. First, it requires political speakers to
recognize and articulate the ways in which a policy they support advances their personal conception of what is good and meaningful in
life. That is, where the norm of public reason requires speakers to
75
76
77
78

See Hill & O’Hara, supra note 60, at 1720, 1745.
Fairfax, supra note 26, at 803.
Hill & O’Hara, supra note 60, at 1720.
See supra text accompanying notes 41-56.
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keep quiet about their overarching “world-view” when talking about
social policy, the norm of expressive over-determination demands that
speakers explicitly acknowledge the connection between their policy
choices and their world-view. 79 Second, Kahan would require people
to speak about a preferred policy in ways that allow other people to
see the policy as “expressing meanings distinctive of their worldviews
as well.” 80 In order to ensure that policy proposals can be determined
or justified through multiple world-views (i.e., that proposals can be
“expressively overdetermined”), political speakers would be “strictly
forbidden to engage in forms of advocacy calculated to render laws
and policies univocal in their meanings.” 81
It may be optimistic, and perhaps patronizing, to think that controversial policy proposals can always “admit of multiple cultural
interpretations.” 82 It seems inevitable that some kinds of proposals
will inevitably resonate more with an “individualist” rather than an
“egalitarian,” or vice-versa. It may be sufficient instead to tweak the
second step of Kahan’s prescription and say that speakers should be
required to explicitly and sincerely address the ways in which their
preferred policy advances their own world-view and the ways in
which it at least does not unduly threaten the world views of others.
Such an approach still achieves the dual benefits that Kahan seeks of
first, alerting the speaker to the biased nature of her own positions,
and, second, disarming her interlocutors’ reasonable fears that their
world view may be threatened by a policy advocated by someone with
a world-view different from their own. 83
79

Kahan refers to this as the requirement of “expressive candor.” Kahan,
supra note 45, at 145.
80
Id.
81
Id. Kahan provides several examples of the utility of “expressive overdetermination” in public health regulation. For example, he argues that world-view
conflicts had inhibited the development of sound anti-pollution policies in the 1970s
and 1980s. To critics of the anti-nuclear power movement of those decades, “it became obvious . . . that the perception of nuclear risks was a product of ‘cultural bias’
on the part of egalitarian collectivists whose ‘sectarian’ worldview would be affirmed
by the gutting of the nuclear industry.” But similar biases were easily seen to be animating any given proponent of nuclear power since “risk dismissiveness suited the
needs of the ‘market individualist,’ whose reverence for private orderings predisposed
him [or her] to a belief in the resilience of nature and the evolutionary wisdom of
markets.” Id. at 140. However, widespread support for emissions regulation was
finally engendered in the 1990s because of the “expressive overdetermination” of
innovative reforms like tradable emissions legislation. Such laws “simultaneously
affirmed egalitarians’ commitment to environmental protection and individualists’
commitment to markets as a means of attaining societal ends.” Id. at 146.
82
Douglas Kysar, The Consultants’ Republic, 121 HARV. L. REV. 2041, 2073
(2008) (book review) (interpreting Kahan).
83
Kahan, supra note 45, at 145.
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Kahan intends for “expressive over-determination” to be deployed
in political discourse, where it will replace the norm of public reason.
But his framework might be usefully installed, with alteration, as a
discourse norm for corporate speech on behalf of multiple stakeholders. 84 Instead of urging directors to appeal to world-view categories,
we might insist that they speak in a manner that explicitly makes clear
the ways in which a proposed course of corporate action is likely to
advance shareholder interests as well as making clear the ways in
which the proposal would affect other groups of stakeholders. Directors would be obliged to speak with candor in terms that resonate with
the particular interests of each of the groups. For example, they might
speak of risks of loss and chances of profits when expressing the
shareholders stake in corporate action, wages, working conditions,
and job security when speaking of the consequences of a corporate
choice for workers, and cost, quality and consumption consequences
when expressing the intended or likely effect of a corporate decision
on the firm’s consumers. 85
Firms with fiduciary obligations to multiple stakeholders might
also be expected to speak in an expressively over-determined fashion
when they speak to their different constituencies through advertising,
disclosures, or public statements. To comply with the norm, for example, firms would be forbidden from making a statement to share84
I have previously critiqued “expressive overdetermination” for its “unwarranted agnosticism” regarding the content of world-views and have urged policymakers to focus instead on repudiating cognitive frameworks, such as “dispositionism,”
that we know to be false, even if they are intuitively appealing. See David G.Yosifon,
Legal Theoretic Inadequacy and Obesity Epidemic Analysis, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV.
681, 724-33 (2008). Here I am concerned with pursuing the ways in which Kahan’s
model might usefully be employed by corporations in their external and internal
speech.
85
Professor Lyman Johnson’s call to authorize religious language in the
boardroom might provide a practical adjunct to the project of expressiveoverdetermination in board governance. Lyman Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness in
Corporate Theory, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 1 (2007). Johnson laments what he sees as the
impoverished quality of discourse in the corporate boardroom. Pursuing a richer
conception of what constitutes “good faith” conduct on the part of corporate directors,
Johnson argues that the hyper-secular nature of boardroom discourse norms precludes
directors from drawing on the rich reservoirs of “good faith”-like language from their
spiritual or religious traditions when they talk about what is required of themselves
and their fellow board members. Because language abhors a vacuum, this prohibition
leads to board-room discussions that are denuded of all the qualities of language that
make grappling with hard questions manageable in other areas of life. Licensing a
wider range of “good faith” vocabulary might be of practical benefit to a board deliberating on multiple stakeholder interests in an expressively over-deterministic fashion. Johnson has in mind mostly the stories, metaphors, psalms, epigrams, and
proverbs that are part of the world’s various religious traditions. Id. at 31-34.
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holders about the profitability of a particular course of action without
also expressing to consumers how their interest is implicated in the
proposed action, and also speaking to workers about how the plans
would affect them. The form of such speech need not be prescribed
with nuance or particularity. Certainly a prospectus sent to shareholders need not have a section directed at consumers, and general advertising to consumers need not also contain information about
cost-of-living increases for workers in the next year. But taken as a
whole, to comply with this prescriptive norm, the firm’s statements to
its various stakeholders would have to express in over-determined
fashion how each of the firm’s stakeholders stand to benefit or are
exposed to risk by corporate decisions.
Courts could enforce this standard only in the limited ways that
they presently enforce fiduciary discourse standards owed to shareholders. While courts could not enforce substantive standards or impose liability for “bad” decisions for fear of undermining the authority
and discretion of the board of directors, the overarching obligation of
candor, completeness and good-faith is one that courts can and do
undertake to enforce on behalf of shareholders through the mechanisms of shareholder derivative suits under state law. The fiduciary
discourse obligation could similarly be enforced on behalf of other
stakeholders through “stakeholder derivative” suits to enforce directors’ obligations to them. 86 Or the standard might be enforced by ex86

I do not suggest that so dramatic an expansion of fiduciary obligations
could be accomplished through judicial innovation alone. Legislative action at the
state or federal level would be required. The detailed specification of what statutory
language would be necessary to institutionalize multi-stakeholder corporate governance is beyond the scope of this article. My primary concern here has been with
demonstrating, first, that such a standard is necessary, and second, that such a standard can be accomplished by altering the discourse norms that underlie corporate
speech to and about its various stakeholders. Nevertheless, something as straightforward as the following would suffice to begin to shift corporate law dynamics in the
desired direction if it were incorporated into state corporate law: “The board of directors shall manage the firm in the best interests of the corporation’s shareholders,
workers, and consumers.” This kind of broad legislative innovation could then be
fleshed out through corporate law’s traditional reliance on the courts to develop
workable rules for particular circumstances and recurring problems, perhaps in ways
suggested by this Article. Because states compete against each other for corporate
chartering fees, and because shareholders benefit from the presently dominant shareholder primacy regime, legislative reform in any one state (e.g., Delaware) calling for
multiple-stakeholder governance is unlikely to be effective, as firms would simply
reincorporate in a different state that seeks to benefit from chartering fees by continuing to offer shareholder primacy in its corporate law. Such a “race to the bottom”
(from the perspective of non-shareholding stakeholders) may require a move towards
federal chartering of corporations. The federalization of corporate law has already
been underway in piecemeal fashion, though departure from shareholder primacy has

2011]

CORPORATE SPEECH TO MULTIPLE STAKEHOLDERS

221

tending the reach of the federal securities laws to non-shareholding
stakeholders. 87
2. Integrity in Firm Governance
As noted above, since the 1930s corporate law scholars have for
the most part been pre-occupied with the “agency problem” in corporate law. 88 One of the most prominent contemporary analysts of the
agency problem, Michael Jensen, has late in his career come to the
conclusion that the traditional agency problem has been well-enough
solved. 89 Jensen, working with co-authors Werner H. Erhard and
Steve Zaffron, asserts that the more pressing contemporary problem of
unrealized corporate value relates not to failures in the principal-agent
relationship, but rather failures in the more intimate relationship between the agent and herself. Jensen refers to this as the problem of
“integrity”—or the lack of integrity, in the life of the agent. What is of
particular interest to the present inquiry is Jensen’s conclusion that the
“integrity” of corporate agents can be improved through the adoption

not yet been on the menu. See generally Stephen Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law, 26 REG. 26 (2003) (arguing that the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation was the most dramatic expansion of federal regulatory power).
87
Interestingly, the seminal laws creating and empowering the Securities and
Exchange Commission actually seem to authorize the SEC to make rules in connection with the purchase and sale of securities that are generally in the public interest,
even where “the public interest” is distinct form shareholder interests. For example,
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1933 makes it unlawful
(b) [t]o use . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . .
any manipulative or deceptive device . . . in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006) (both emphases added). Nevertheless, the securities regulation apparatus has not yet been put to use directly in the service of most nonshareholding workers and consumers.
88
See supra text accompanying notes 12-15.
89
See Werner H. Erhard, Michael C. Jensen, & Steve Zaffron, Integrity: A
Positive Model that Incorporates the Normative Phenomena of Morality, Ethics, and
Legality (Harvard Business School NOM Unit Working Paper No. 10-061, 2010)
[hereinafter
Integrity:
A
Positive
Model],
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1542759; see also Jensen, supra
note 3 (explicating the integrity project). For ease of reference and because his work
is of abiding interest to corporate law scholars, I attribute this work in the text to
“Jensen,” while reiterating the collaborative nature of his project by reference here
and in subsequent footnotes. Regarding the view that the traditional agency problem
has been more or less well contained, see Jensen, supra note 3 (emphasizing the overlapping power of several modern solutions to the shareholder’s monitoring problem,
including most importantly the capital markets, the law of fiduciary obligation, and
modern compensation structures for upper-management).
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of a different kind of discourse norm than presently prevails in corporate speech. 90
By integrity, Jensen means wholeness, completeness, and coherence. 91 People or systems that lack integrity always underperform,
sometimes catastrophically. 92 He argues that things, processes, individuals, and relationships all have more “workability” when they operate with integrity. Critics may argue that Jensen’s new project differs little from familiar concepts of efficiency and that all that is new
here is a proposal to pursue a presently underappreciated approach to
efficiency gains. This critique is almost inevitable given Jensen’s insistence that his program of integrity is not a normative guidepost but
an agnostic map of “workability.” 93 Others might reasonably think
that while it is nice to have Jensen in the conversation, work on the
relationship between integrity and productivity has been a longstanding theme in progressive—especially feminist—corporate
theory. 94 I nevertheless think Jensen’s work is valuable as an illustration of this Article’s claim that discourse norms can be instrumentally
deployed to achieve desired results in corporate operations.
Jensen argues that the best way that individuals and relationships
can operate with integrity is through people living by their “word.” To
be a person of integrity a person must honor their word. Now, for Jensen, honoring one’s word is not the same as keeping one’s word. To
keep one’s word means to do or not do exactly what you say you will.
But only a person with a very small life, and very few responsibilities,
could possibly keep their word all of the time. For most people serv90

Any prescriptive tool promising greater efficiency must meet the question
of why the churning market, filled with greedy individuals, has not already implemented it. Jensen explains the market’s failure to achieve integrity gains as a function
of cognitive, motivational, and behavioral biases—he relies on the same literature that
I rely on to demonstrate the futility of the shareholder primacy norm as it relates to
non-shareholder interests. See supra text accompanying notes 15-21. The economist
in Jensen cannot keep from associating a number with his project—he argues that
organizations that operate with integrity in the manner he defines it will increase
productivity by 100–500% over their non-integrity levels. Jensen also claims that in
corporate operations 25% of unrealized productivity is attributable to the agency
problem, 25% to the problem of co-locating information and decision-rights, 25% to
the problem of integrity, and 25% to as-yet unknown causes. See Jensen, supra note
3. The implausibility of this kind of quantification strikes me as unnecessarily distracting from the overall cogency and utility of his general claims.
91
Integrity: A Positive Model, supra note 89, at 18.
92
Id. at 31-41. Jensen provides examples of the adverse consequences of
“out of integrity” behavior in numerous contexts including academics, business, and
religious organizations. Id. at 72 & n.47, 74.
93
See id. at 44.
94
See, e.g., The Public Choice Problem in Corporate Law, supra note 8, at
285-93.
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ing in complex roles, things come up, delays happen, priorities shift,
and it is not always possible or desirable to keep the very letter of
your word. The person who honors her word may sometimes not keep
her word, but she will always take responsibility for remedying any
problems caused by her failure to keep her word. 95
To improve workability, Jensen argues that we should adopt a
discourse norm in which your “word” automatically encompasses not
only everything you explicitly promise to do, but also everything that
other people expect of you. 96 You do not have to do exactly what others expect of you, this is merely a default rule. You can opt out of this
default by making clear to others that you will not be doing what they
expect you to be doing. Going further, in Jensen’s system your
“word” also by default includes what society’s ethical, moral and legal codes expect of you. To be a person of integrity you must either
honor what other people and society expects of you, or you must
“publicly announce” that such expectations do not, after all, constitute
your word. 97
Under this system, your word runs to all of the people or groups
with whom you want to have a workable relationship. Jensen is in
particular concerned with the set of relationships that comprise corporate activity. Deploying his discourse norm to advance multi-fiduciary
corporate governance would involve requiring organizational integrity
towards shareholders, creditors, workers, and consumers. Jensen believes that directors are presently involved in a tremendous amount of
95
Integrity: A Positive Model, supra note 89, at 22. Jensen insists that his
project is “ontological,” that he and his collaborators have discovered something
fundamental about how the universe works, and how people work within it. Jensen is
a businessman, in the end, not a philosopher or social scientist, and so at least for him
it seems little more important to know precisely why “integrity” is powerful than it is
to know the physics or chemistry that makes coal burnable for fuel. See id. at 19-20.
96
Id. at 52.
97
To ratchet up “workability” one more level, Jensen and his co-authors
introduce an asymmetry into their integrity discourse norm. While your word encompasses everything that is expected of you, when you are thinking about someone
else’s word your expectations regarding that other person do not, for you, count as
their word. For you, other people’s word only includes what they explicitly say or
agree to do. Thus, within the integrity norm you cannot assume others will honor your
expectations of them, because your expectations do not, for you, constitute their word.
This is so even though you must consider their expectations of you to be your word.
See id. at 52. In the corporate context, this element of Jensen’s program should perhaps be limited to the firm’s internal discourse on the board of directors between
directors and officers, and between officers and employees. With respect to the firm’s
speech to its stakeholders we may not want people to rely only on what the firm actually says it will do. Indeed, the power of fiduciary obligation in corporate governance is that it allows corporate stakeholders to put their faith in the firm without
having to say anything or listen very much to corporate managers.
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destructive out-of-integrity behavior in their relationships to their
shareholders and the capital markets generally. 98 This problem of out
of integrity behavior can also be seen with respect to other stakeholders. That is, in their market discourse with non-shareholding stakeholders, corporations adhere to a far narrower conception of what
counts as honoring their “word” than would prevail under an integrity
regime. For a corporation to be in integrity, the firm’s directors and
managers must internally honor their word, and must honor their word
externally in what the firm says to, or what is expected of it by, multiple stakeholders. 99
Jensen argues that an important cause of out-of-integrity behavior
is that people mistakenly use cost-benefit analysis to decide if they are
going to honor their word or not. While individuals and organizations
should certainly do a cost-benefit analysis when determining what
they will give their word to, once a word is given it should be honored
without any further analysis of the costs of doing so. If you do a costbenefit analysis when it comes to honoring your word it makes you
untrustworthy and undermines the workability of your relationships. I
think that one of the reasons that corporate actors engage in costbenefit analysis at every turn is because of the lack of any other
salient framework through which to analyze what they ought to do.
Jensen’s integrity discourse norm provides corporate actors with a
fresh and rich language that they can use to give shape to their sense
of their own commitments, and how they talk about those commitments to themselves and to others.
It is worth noting the impressive “expressive over-determination”
in Jensen’s invocation of the “word” in his integrity project. When I
heard him present his idea at Stanford University in February 2010
Jensen had the full crowd rapt as he kept invoking “your word,” “my
word,” “living by our word.” 100 For many listeners there must have
been an inescapable religious connotation. “In the beginning, was the
word, and the word was with God, and the word was God.” 101 Christians often refer to Jesus as the embodied “Word” of God. 102 To philo98

Jensen and his co-authors emphasize in particular the problem of corporate
boards managing earnings in order to give the impression that the firm has comported
with their own prior projections or analyst expectations. See id. at 75 n.54.
99
One source of the gains that Jensen and his co-authors expect from their
integrity system is through the power that it has to generate trust in relationships. But
the integrity norm is well calibrated for optimization, rather than maximization of
trust.
100
See Jensen, supra note 3.
101
John 1:1 (Revised Standard Version).
102
See John 1:14 (Revised Standard Version) (“And the Word became flesh
and dwelt among us . . . .”).
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sophers, invocation of the term “word” invites reflection on its ancient
etymology in the term logos, which is also a synonym for “reason.” 103
When attesting to the credibility, skillfulness, or character of another,
we put in “a word” for them (if we are delivering a negative report
about someone, we do not call it putting in a “word”). 104 “Word” is
used in urban slang to express agreement, concurrence, and affirmation. 105 Because it is infused with so much meaning to so many different constituents, Jensen’s integrity discourse norm can help corporate
boards develop governance dynamics which are responsive to the
wide-ranging interests of multiple constituents. 106
C. The Constitutionality of Prescriptive Discourse Norms in
Corporate Governance Law
This prescriptive discourse norms project attempts to grapple with
the problems of corporate speech without resorting to the blunt instruments of censorship that the Supreme Court has forbidden. 107 Instead of imposing external restrictions on corporate commercial or
political speech, this approach instead focuses on altering internal
corporate governance dynamics in a way that is likely to generate
more socially useful corporate speech.
Moving from shareholder primacy to multi-stakeholder corporate
governance attempts to change the way that corporations speak internally about and externally to corporate stakeholders. Regarding internal corporate dynamics, changing the fiduciary obligations of direc103
104
105

See 8 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1113 (2d ed. 1989).
See 20 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 527 (2d ed. 1989).
Word, n. and int., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (Dft. Rev. Mar.

2011),
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/230192?rskey=DGSER5&result=1&isAdvanced=fal
se# (defining and providing the etymology of “word”).
106
Jensen demonstrates the power of the integrity discourse norm by embodying it in the public delivery of his work. When he spoke at Stanford University, supra
note 3, he promised in a confident staccato to deliver something new that would
change every aspect of all of our lives. He said the integrity norm has revolutionized
the operation of companies with which he is involved, including SSRN, which he
founded and helps run as a private for-profit enterprise. Acknowledging that his audience—comprised of business scholars, lawyers, directors and officers of publicly
traded firms—was likely not used to “such blunt talk,” he confessed to us that he had
cheated on his wife, had affairs that ruined his marriage and hurt his family—his
daughter was in the room, he said she would corroborate it. He said he would have
been a better man, a greater scholar, if he had lived his life with integrity (this is one
of the most important business scholars of the last fifty years). He noted happily that
it is not just SSRN which is thriving, but also his romantic relationship with a new
partner, with whom he is in integrity. The talk is available in its entirety on the website of Stanford University Law School’s Rock Center for Corporate Governance. Id.
107
See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.

HEALTH MATRIX

226

[Vol. 21:189

tors of publicly traded corporations, and altering corporate discourse
norms as a way of enforcing those obligations, does not run afoul of
any First Amendment restrictions. Nobody has suggested that Smith v.
Van Gorkom, 108 which requires directors of Delaware corporations to
engage in informed, good-faith discourse about what kind of corporate
conduct is in the shareholder’s best interests, is an unconstitutional
standard on First Amendment grounds. Nor has it been suggested that
Van Gorkom, and nothing else, is a constitutionally required standard
for corporate speech. If prescriptive discourse would be unconstitutional, then the current regime, which is highly prescriptive on its own
terms, is unconstitutional.
From the perspective developed by this Article, enforcing a fiduciary standard on external corporate speech to multiple stakeholders
should not necessarily present First Amendment problems either. Presently corporations must adhere to fiduciary norms when speaking to
shareholders. 109 This standard has not been criticized on First
Amendment grounds because it has been assumed that the fiduciary
discourse standard is part of the private contractual obligation between shareholders and their firms, rather than an externally imposed
government regulation. 110 I have argued that the relatively more lax
discourse standards that presently govern corporate speech to nonshareholders should also be seen as an implicit term in the corporate
“nexus-of-contracts.” Altering that default term to provide for a fidu108

488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). In the Van Gorkom case several directors of
Trans-Union, Inc., a large publicly traded corporation, were found to have violated
their fiduciary obligations to the shareholders when they sold the company for too
low of a price. Id. at 864-70, 888. The directors were held liable not because of the
substance of their decision, but because of their failure to become informed and to
deliberate as a board about the value of the company and the proposed transaction. Id.
at 893. (The company was actually sold at a substantial premium over market price,
but the sale was pulled off in a very short amount of time, without substantial
process). Id. at 864-70. Van Gorkom establishes the modern standard of directorial
liability—there is no liability for substantively bad decisions, but there is liability for
failing to deliberate about decisions in an informed, good faith-fashion.
109
Corporate speech to shareholders is presently heavily regulated both by
state corporate law and federal securities laws which impose substantial disclosure
requirements in connection with the sale of securities; such regulations have so far not
been struck down on First Amendment grounds. See generally Aleta G. Estreicher,
Securities Regulation and the First Amendment, 24 GA. L. REV. 223 (1990) (analyzing application of First Amendment to the federal securities laws); Nicholas Wolfson,
The First Amendment and the SEC, 20 CONN. L. REV. 265, 265-266 (1988) (“examin[ing] the impact of the first amendment on the principal areas of SEC regulation”
and arguing that corporate proxy statements, prospectuses, accounting statements, and
the like are all methods of expression that should be fully protected by the First
Amendment.).
110
See supra text accompanying notes 10-14.
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ciary discourse standard for corporate speech to workers and consumers should thus present no more daunting a First Amendment problem
than does corporate law’s present embrace of such a standard for corporate speech to shareholders. This article does not advocate banning
shareholder primacy corporations or the non-fiduciary speech that
such firms might speak to workers or consumers. Instead, it advocates
setting the off-the-rack default terms for corporate charters in such a
manner that would require directors of publicly traded firms to act as
fiduciaries to multiple stakeholders, and conform their discourse to
fiduciary standards in all corporate speech about or to such constituents. Shareholders are not entitled to the default terms of shareholder
primacy in corporate charters. We should give the support of our public institutions, including our corporate law, securities laws, tax laws,
and other public advantage, to such stakeholder equality corporations.
Nevertheless, even if one were to take the view that the First
Amendment would forbid the imposition of fiduciary discourse standards on corporate speech to multiple stakeholders, given the latitude
that the Supreme Court has required for corporate commercial and
political speech, 111 it would seem much more difficult to argue that
government cannot prescribe corporate default terms that call for multi-stakeholder governance and concomitant fiduciary-based internal
corporate speech about shareholders, employers and consumers.
These permissible changes to internal corporate discourse would likely be sufficient to spur significant changes over present patterns in the
way that corporations speak to non-shareholders, without requiring
formal, heavy-hand government enforcement of external corporate
speech.

CONCLUSION
Corporate speech contributes to many public policy problems,
perhaps most obviously in the area of public health. Through advertising and other commercial speech, firms manipulate consumer perceptions of the risks or other consequences associated with the consumption of their products. Through lobbying and other political speech
corporations undermine the development of government regulations
which might otherwise curb exploitative corporate conduct in the
commercial arena. The shareholder primacy norm in corporate governance is the real culprit behind this dynamic. Corporate law tells
directors to run their firms in the interests of shareholders alone, while
other stakeholders are left to fend for themselves or else rely on ineffectual external governmental regulation.
111

See supra text accompanying notes 5-6 and 22.
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These corporate speech problems can be solved through the
reform of corporate law. In particular, this Article has argued that the
pernicious effects of corporate speech can be ameliorated by extending the fiduciary obligations of corporate directors to include nonshareholding stakeholders that are otherwise targets of corporate misconduct, including employees and consumers. A multi-stakeholder
corporate governance regime could be institutionalized by altering the
discourse norms that underlie and give shape to corporate speech.
Such a reform would change the way that corporate directors speak
about various stakeholders in their internal deliberations and decisionmaking, and it would change the way that firms speak to their various
stakeholders through advertising and other externally directed speech.
This Article has also examined a sampling of discourse norms which
scholars, policymakers, and businesspeople might look to when institutionalizing multi-stakeholder corporate governance, including familiar norms that govern personal or fiduciary engagements, as well as
fully artificial ones, such as “expressive overdetermination,” 112 or
“integrity.” 113 Future work in this area may reveal other discourse
norms that could improve the social utility of corporate speech by
getting corporations to speak about and for the interests of all of their
stakeholders, rather than for shareholders alone.
The reforms explored in this Article involve corporation-based,
process-oriented solutions to the problems associated with contemporary corporate speech. These prescriptions are anchored in an abiding
faith in the fundamental process-orientation of corporate law and a
belief that specific solutions to specific corporate problems must come
from within our firms, rather than be imposed from the outside by
external regulators, or law professors. As the Jensen quote at the start
of this Article asserts, “it is only the Board that this in the end can
come from.” 114 It would be incongruous, therefore, to assert with any
specificity what specific policies or innovations should or would
emerge from multi-stakeholder corporate governance. Nevertheless,
without violating the substantive abstention which both corporate law
and corporate law scholarship must always embrace, it might plausibly be imagined that corporate boards charged with the obligation to
speak openly, honestly and sincerely about the interests of multiple
stakeholders might manage their firms in such a manner as to, for
example, forefend from artificially increasing the levels of addictive
nicotine in the tobacco they grow for use in cigarettes, or they might
better alert consumers of junk-food to the adverse health
112
113
114

See supra text accompanying notes 80-89.
See supra text accompanying notes 90-109.
Supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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consequences associated with substantial weight gain, or perhaps they
would include more state-of-the-art environmental safeguards when
drilling for oil in fragile ecosystems. 115 What more to be said can only
be said by specific corporate boards, addressing particular circumstances, on behalf of multiple stakeholders.

115

See supra note 4 (citing literature on corporate complicity in public health
problems including the tobacco epidemic, the obesity problem, and environmental
degradation).

